fix(app): PC control as the real agent-desktop behaves on Windows
Checked against agent-desktop 1.2.0 on the Windows test VM (normal and elevated sessions); each fault has a test: - the state folder is made private to the current user: a data folder outside the user profile inherits Authenticated Users: Modify and agent-desktop then refused every reading (INTERNAL), which broke all of PC control on such PCs - run with the program already open uses the window agent-desktop names instead of waiting for a new one (failed after 5.3 s, now 0.6 s); several copies get their own reason - keys to a window Windows will not bring to the front says so (NOT_FRONT) and sends nothing - close that a save dialog holds up, or several copies, get their own reasons instead of a generic failure - an action that closes its own window answers done with no elements - fields a reading showed as secure are refused as password fields before anything is sent Verified on the VM: calculator 1 2 + 3 = read back 15, Notepad type, ctrl+a and a letter, elevated windows refused from a normal session and normal ones not, the emergency stop killing a running command and blocking acting while reading works. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -226,16 +226,23 @@ agent-desktop and decides who may.
|
||||
next to `jarvis.exe` (`agent-desktop.exe`, about 4 MB) and checked before every start of the
|
||||
services (a wrong hash means not available). One CLI run per command (M0 `desktop`: 0.10 s, as
|
||||
fast as its MCP server), its APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA and state folder (`AGENT_DESKTOP_HOME`, where
|
||||
it keeps its readings) in the data folder (`runtime/agent-desktop`), a 15 s limit per command. A
|
||||
it keeps its readings) in the data folder (`runtime/agent-desktop`, made afresh at each start and
|
||||
private to the person: agent-desktop refuses a state folder others may write to, which a folder
|
||||
outside the user's profile is by inheritance), a 15 s limit per command. A
|
||||
program it starts gets the person's own APPDATA and LOCALAPPDATA back and starts in their user
|
||||
folder. Actions are headless (no cursor, no focus), except `keys`, which brings the window to the
|
||||
front first (`focus-window`, then `press`). `--force` (which lifts its block on Alt+F4, Win+R,
|
||||
Ctrl+Shift+Esc and the like) and the raw mouse and key commands are never used; what the brain
|
||||
sends is checked so nothing in it reads as an option, and typed text goes in through stdin
|
||||
(`set-value --stdin`), never in the arguments. The commands: `list-windows`, `snapshot
|
||||
front first (`focus-window`, then `press`); when Windows does not let it come forward (its
|
||||
foreground lock), no key is sent ("그 창을 앞으로 가져오지 못해 키를 보내지 않았습니다"). `--force`
|
||||
(which lifts its block on Alt+F4, Win+R, Ctrl+Shift+Esc and the like) and the raw mouse and key
|
||||
commands are never used; what the brain sends is checked so nothing in it reads as an option,
|
||||
and typed text goes in through stdin (`set-value --stdin`), never in the arguments. The commands: `list-windows`, `snapshot
|
||||
--window-id` (`read`), `click`, `get --property states` then `set-value` (`type`), `focus-window`
|
||||
then `press` (`keys`), `launch` (`run`), `close-app` (`close`: agent-desktop has no command for
|
||||
one window, so the program closes gracefully with all its windows), `restore`.
|
||||
one window, so the program closes gracefully with all its windows; one still running when
|
||||
agent-desktop gives up, a save question say, is "프로그램이 아직 닫히지 않았습니다(저장할지 묻는 창이
|
||||
떠 있을 수 있습니다). 창을 다시 읽어 주세요", and with several of it running close-app cannot
|
||||
choose: "그 프로그램이 여러 개 실행 중이라 이 창만 닫을 수 없습니다. 창의 닫기 단추를 눌러 주세요"),
|
||||
`restore`.
|
||||
- **Windows**: as `list-windows` gives them, without this app's own windows, windows without a
|
||||
title and the programs of `pcControl.screenExclude` (never listed, read or acted on, as for
|
||||
screen viewing); at most 30. `window` is a window id or part of a title or program name (the
|
||||
@@ -243,7 +250,10 @@ agent-desktop and decides who may.
|
||||
it was read from; one from a reading this run did not make gets `STALE_REF`'s reason. `run` takes
|
||||
a program name only (no folders): one in Windows' folders as it is, else the file Windows' App
|
||||
Paths or a Start menu shortcut without arguments points at; the window is the one `launch` names,
|
||||
else a new one of its process or name, else the only new one, waited for up to 5 s.
|
||||
else a new one of its process or name, else the only new one, waited for up to 5 s. A program
|
||||
already running is not started again: `launch` attaches to it and names its window; with several
|
||||
running it cannot choose ("그 프로그램이 이미 여러 개 실행 중이라 새로 열지 못했습니다. 열린 창 중에서
|
||||
골라 주세요").
|
||||
- **Available** only on Windows with `features.pcControl` on, someone in `pcControl.allowedUsers`
|
||||
and agent-desktop present; otherwise `pcControl` is in the brain's `disabled_tools`. Settings
|
||||
apply on the next start.
|
||||
@@ -253,8 +263,8 @@ agent-desktop and decides who may.
|
||||
사람만 PC를 조작할 수 있습니다"), a kind at `never` ("PC 제어 화면에서 이 동작이 꺼져 있습니다").
|
||||
At `ask` the action is done only with `consent: true`, else the answer is `ask: true` with the
|
||||
kinds and the window (the brain asks the person; the app does not keep consent).
|
||||
- **Never**: typing into a password field (agent-desktop reports it, or Windows UI Automation's
|
||||
IsPassword) is refused ("비밀번호 칸에는 입력하지 않습니다"); a window run as administrator is
|
||||
- **Never**: typing into a password field (agent-desktop reports it as `secure`: in the reading the
|
||||
element came from, anywhere in its tree, or by `get` now) is refused ("비밀번호 칸에는 입력하지 않습니다"); a window run as administrator is
|
||||
refused before acting ("관리자 권한으로 실행된 창은 조작할 수 없습니다"), and `run` never asks for
|
||||
administrator rights.
|
||||
- **Anti-cheat**: while a game with an anti-cheat runs, every action but `windows` and `read` is
|
||||
@@ -275,7 +285,8 @@ agent-desktop and decides who may.
|
||||
holds it) is a warning in the log. A reading started while the stop is on runs to its end.
|
||||
- **Results**: `read` and every action answer with the window `{id, program, title}` and its
|
||||
interactive elements read afresh after the action (at most 200), so the brain says it was done
|
||||
only from what it sees. agent-desktop's error codes come back as Korean reasons (`STALE_REF`: "화면이
|
||||
only from what it sees; an action that closes its window (a dialog's button, Enter) answers the
|
||||
window with no elements. agent-desktop's error codes come back as Korean reasons (`STALE_REF`: "화면이
|
||||
바뀌었습니다. 다시 읽어 주세요"; a minimised window is restored before acting).
|
||||
- **Refused before asking**: the stop, the anti-cheat, an administrator window (a process whose
|
||||
elevation cannot be read counts as one) and a password field are refused without asking.
|
||||
|
||||
216
app/src/pc.rs
216
app/src/pc.rs
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ pub const ELEVATED: &str = "관리자 권한으로 실행된 창은 조작할
|
||||
pub const STOPPED: &str = "비상 정지 중입니다. 단축키를 한 번 더 누르거나 PC 제어 화면에서 풀어 주세요";
|
||||
pub const STALE: &str = "화면이 바뀌었습니다. 다시 읽어 주세요";
|
||||
const NO_WINDOW: &str = "그 창을 찾지 못했습니다";
|
||||
const NOT_FRONT: &str = "그 창을 앞으로 가져오지 못해 키를 보내지 않았습니다";
|
||||
const NOT_CLOSED: &str = "프로그램이 아직 닫히지 않았습니다(저장할지 묻는 창이 떠 있을 수 있습니다). 창을 다시 읽어 주세요";
|
||||
const CLOSE_SEVERAL: &str = "그 프로그램이 여러 개 실행 중이라 이 창만 닫을 수 없습니다. 창의 닫기 단추를 눌러 주세요";
|
||||
const RUNNING_SEVERAL: &str = "그 프로그램이 이미 여러 개 실행 중이라 새로 열지 못했습니다. 열린 창 중에서 골라 주세요";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Anti-cheats found by their processes (file names, lower case): the anti-cheat's name, and the
|
||||
/// game's when the process is the game itself. Vanguard's driver is always loaded, so it is found
|
||||
@@ -221,7 +225,16 @@ pub struct Cli {
|
||||
impl Cli {
|
||||
pub fn new(exe: &Path, data: &Path) -> Self {
|
||||
let home = data.join("runtime").join("agent-desktop");
|
||||
// agent-desktop refuses a state folder others may write to ("private file DACL grants an
|
||||
// untrusted principal": a data folder outside the user's profile inherits Authenticated
|
||||
// Users' Modify), so it is made afresh, private to this user; a run's readings are of no
|
||||
// use to the next.
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&home);
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(&home);
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
if !win::make_private(&home) {
|
||||
crate::warn_log!("conversation", "Warning: agent-desktop's state folder could not be made private: PC control may fail");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Cli { exe: exe.to_path_buf(), home, limit: COMMAND_LIMIT }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -389,6 +402,15 @@ fn refused(reason: &str) -> Fail {
|
||||
/// agent-desktop's error code as the reason the person hears.
|
||||
fn failed(code: &str, action: &str) -> Fail {
|
||||
let reason = match code {
|
||||
// Windows' foreground lock: focus-window could not bring the window forward, or press
|
||||
// could not confirm its focus; no key was sent.
|
||||
"ACTION_FAILED" | "STALE_REF" if action == "keys" => NOT_FRONT,
|
||||
// close-app gives up while the program still runs (a save question, say).
|
||||
"TIMEOUT" | "APP_TIMEOUT" if action == "close" => NOT_CLOSED,
|
||||
// close-app picks the program by name; with several running it cannot choose.
|
||||
"AMBIGUOUS_TARGET" if action == "close" => CLOSE_SEVERAL,
|
||||
// launch attaches to one running instance; with several it cannot choose.
|
||||
"AMBIGUOUS_TARGET" if action == "run" => RUNNING_SEVERAL,
|
||||
"STALE_REF" | "SNAPSHOT_NOT_FOUND" | "ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND" => STALE,
|
||||
"AMBIGUOUS_TARGET" => "같은 모양의 항목이 여럿이라 고를 수 없습니다. 다시 읽어 주세요",
|
||||
"APP_NOT_FOUND" if action == "run" => "그 프로그램을 찾지 못했습니다",
|
||||
@@ -482,6 +504,22 @@ fn elements(tree: &Value) -> Vec<Value> {
|
||||
})).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The refs of a reading's fields agent-desktop reports as secure (password fields), in the whole
|
||||
/// tree, not only the elements shown.
|
||||
fn secure_refs(tree: &Value) -> HashSet<String> {
|
||||
fn walk(n: &Value, out: &mut HashSet<String>) {
|
||||
for c in n["children"].as_array().into_iter().flatten() {
|
||||
if let Some(r) = c["ref_id"].as_str().filter(|_| c["states"].as_array().is_some_and(|s| s.iter().any(|x| x == "secure"))) {
|
||||
out.insert(r.to_owned());
|
||||
}
|
||||
walk(c, out);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut out = HashSet::new();
|
||||
walk(tree, &mut out);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn args(a: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
a.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -495,8 +533,9 @@ pub struct Pc {
|
||||
game: Box<dyn Fn() -> Option<String> + Send + Sync>,
|
||||
/// This app's process: its windows are never listed or acted on.
|
||||
own_pid: u64,
|
||||
/// The latest readings' windows by snapshot id, so an element names its window.
|
||||
readings: Mutex<VecDeque<(String, Win)>>,
|
||||
/// The latest readings by snapshot id: the window, so an element names its window, and the
|
||||
/// fields read as secure (password fields; agent-desktop cannot address them again by `get`).
|
||||
readings: Mutex<VecDeque<(String, Win, HashSet<String>)>>,
|
||||
/// One action at a time.
|
||||
one: Mutex<()>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -587,6 +626,10 @@ impl Pc {
|
||||
if text.chars().count() > MAX_TEXT {
|
||||
return Err(refused("글자가 너무 깁니다 (2,000자까지)"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let read_secure = self.readings.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, _, s)| s.contains(element.unwrap()));
|
||||
if read_secure {
|
||||
return Err(refused(PASSWORD));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let states = self.cmd(&args(&["get", element.unwrap(), "--property", "states"]), None, "type")?;
|
||||
let secure = states["value"].as_array().is_none_or(|s| s.iter().any(|x| x == "secure"));
|
||||
if secure {
|
||||
@@ -619,7 +662,11 @@ impl Pc {
|
||||
return Ok(Done::Item(json!({"window": w.view(), "elements": []})));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.read(&w).map(Done::Item)
|
||||
match self.read(&w) {
|
||||
// The action closed its window (a dialog's button, Enter): done, nothing left to read.
|
||||
Err(f) if f.code == "WINDOW_NOT_FOUND" => Ok(Done::Item(json!({"window": w.view(), "elements": []}))),
|
||||
r => r.map(Done::Item),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn cmd(&self, args: &[String], stdin: Option<&str>, action: &str) -> Result<Value, Fail> {
|
||||
@@ -659,7 +706,7 @@ impl Pc {
|
||||
/// The window an element was read from, as it is listed now.
|
||||
fn window_of(&self, element: &str) -> Result<Win, Fail> {
|
||||
let snap = element.trim_start_matches('@').split(':').next().unwrap_or("");
|
||||
let id = self.readings.lock().unwrap().iter().find(|(s, _)| s == snap).map(|(_, w)| w.id.clone())
|
||||
let id = self.readings.lock().unwrap().iter().find(|(s, _, _)| s == snap).map(|(_, w, _)| w.id.clone())
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| refused(STALE))?;
|
||||
self.list()?.into_iter().find(|w| w.id == id).ok_or_else(|| refused(STALE))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -673,7 +720,7 @@ impl Pc {
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(snap) = data["snapshot_id"].as_str() {
|
||||
let mut r = self.readings.lock().unwrap();
|
||||
r.push_back((snap.to_owned(), w.clone()));
|
||||
r.push_back((snap.to_owned(), w.clone(), secure_refs(&data["tree"])));
|
||||
while r.len() > KEPT_READINGS {
|
||||
r.pop_front();
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -696,11 +743,14 @@ impl Pc {
|
||||
let lower = name.to_lowercase();
|
||||
let started = Instant::now();
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let new: Vec<Win> = self.list()?.into_iter().filter(|w| !before.contains(&w.id)).collect();
|
||||
let found = new.iter().find(|w| Some(&w.id) == id.as_ref())
|
||||
.or_else(|| new.iter().find(|w| pid.is_some_and(|p| p == w.pid)))
|
||||
.or_else(|| new.iter().find(|w| stem(&w.program).contains(&lower) || w.title.to_lowercase().contains(&lower)))
|
||||
.or(if new.len() == 1 { new.first() } else { None });
|
||||
let list = self.list()?;
|
||||
// A program already running is not started again: launch names its window.
|
||||
let named = list.iter().find(|w| Some(&w.id) == id.as_ref());
|
||||
let new: Vec<&Win> = list.iter().filter(|w| !before.contains(&w.id)).collect();
|
||||
let found = named
|
||||
.or_else(|| new.iter().copied().find(|w| pid.is_some_and(|p| p == w.pid)))
|
||||
.or_else(|| new.iter().copied().find(|w| stem(&w.program).contains(&lower) || w.title.to_lowercase().contains(&lower)))
|
||||
.or(if new.len() == 1 { new.first().copied() } else { None });
|
||||
if let Some(w) = found {
|
||||
return self.read(w);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -842,6 +892,48 @@ mod win {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Make `dir` private to this user: a protected DACL with one entry, full control for the user,
|
||||
/// inherited by what is made inside.
|
||||
pub fn make_private(dir: &std::path::Path) -> bool {
|
||||
use std::os::windows::ffi::OsStrExt;
|
||||
use windows_sys::Win32::Security::{
|
||||
AddAccessAllowedAceEx, GetLengthSid, InitializeAcl, InitializeSecurityDescriptor, SetFileSecurityW,
|
||||
SetSecurityDescriptorControl, SetSecurityDescriptorDacl, TokenUser, ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE, ACL, ACL_REVISION,
|
||||
CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE, DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE, PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
||||
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, SE_DACL_PROTECTED, TOKEN_USER,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::GetCurrentProcess;
|
||||
const FILE_ALL_ACCESS: u32 = 0x001F_01FF;
|
||||
// SAFETY: this process's token queried into a sized, aligned buffer and closed; the ACL and
|
||||
// security descriptor live in buffers that outlive the call that uses them.
|
||||
unsafe {
|
||||
let mut token: HANDLE = std::ptr::null_mut();
|
||||
if OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &mut token) == 0 {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut user = [0u64; 64];
|
||||
let mut len = 0u32;
|
||||
let ok = GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, user.as_mut_ptr().cast(), std::mem::size_of_val(&user) as u32, &mut len) != 0;
|
||||
CloseHandle(token);
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let sid = (*(user.as_ptr() as *const TOKEN_USER)).User.Sid;
|
||||
let acl_len = std::mem::size_of::<ACL>() + std::mem::size_of::<ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE>() + GetLengthSid(sid) as usize;
|
||||
let mut acl = vec![0u32; acl_len.div_ceil(4)];
|
||||
let acl = acl.as_mut_ptr() as *mut ACL;
|
||||
let mut sd: SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR = std::mem::zeroed();
|
||||
let psd = (&mut sd as *mut SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR).cast();
|
||||
let path: Vec<u16> = dir.as_os_str().encode_wide().chain([0]).collect();
|
||||
InitializeAcl(acl, (acl_len.div_ceil(4) * 4) as u32, ACL_REVISION) != 0
|
||||
&& AddAccessAllowedAceEx(acl, ACL_REVISION, OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE | CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE, FILE_ALL_ACCESS, sid) != 0
|
||||
&& InitializeSecurityDescriptor(psd, 1) != 0
|
||||
&& SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(psd, 1, acl, 0) != 0
|
||||
&& SetSecurityDescriptorControl(psd, SE_DACL_PROTECTED, SE_DACL_PROTECTED) != 0
|
||||
&& SetFileSecurityW(path.as_ptr(), DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | PROTECTED_DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, psd) != 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Every running process's file name, lower case (also of processes this user may not open,
|
||||
/// such as anti-cheat services).
|
||||
pub fn processes() -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
@@ -990,6 +1082,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
fail: Option<(&'static str, &'static str)>,
|
||||
calls: Mutex<Vec<(Vec<String>, Option<String>)>>,
|
||||
launched: Value,
|
||||
/// A password field in every reading, past the elements shown; `get` on it is refused as
|
||||
/// the real agent-desktop refuses it (a secure field's identity is not unique).
|
||||
secure_ref: Option<&'static str>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Fake {
|
||||
@@ -999,7 +1094,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
{"id": "w-2", "title": "Vault", "app_name": "KeePassXC.exe", "pid": 11, "is_focused": true, "accessible": true},
|
||||
{"id": "w-3", "title": "Calc", "app_name": "CalculatorApp.exe", "pid": 12, "is_focused": false, "minimized": true}])])),
|
||||
processes: vec!["explorer.exe".into()], elevated: false, secure: false, fail: None,
|
||||
calls: Mutex::new(vec![]), launched: json!({"app": "notepad", "pid": 10})}
|
||||
calls: Mutex::new(vec![]), launched: json!({"app": "notepad", "pid": 10}), secure_ref: None}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn commands(&self) -> Vec<String> {
|
||||
self.calls.lock().unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a[0].clone()).collect()
|
||||
@@ -1021,12 +1116,22 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
return Err(code.into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if args[0] == "get" && self.secure_ref == Some(args[1].as_str()) {
|
||||
return Err("AMBIGUOUS_TARGET".into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(match args[0].as_str() {
|
||||
"list-windows" => {
|
||||
let mut w = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
|
||||
if w.len() > 1 { w.pop_front().unwrap() } else { w[0].clone() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
"snapshot" => json!({"snapshot_id": "s1", "window": {"id": args[2], "title": TITLE}, "tree": tree()}),
|
||||
"snapshot" => {
|
||||
let mut t = tree();
|
||||
if let Some(r) = self.secure_ref {
|
||||
t["children"][0]["children"].as_array_mut().unwrap()
|
||||
.push(json!({"role": "group", "children": [{"role": "textfield", "ref_id": r, "states": ["secure"]}]}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
json!({"snapshot_id": "s1", "window": {"id": args[2], "title": TITLE}, "tree": t})
|
||||
}
|
||||
"get" => json!({"property": "states", "value": if self.secure { json!(["secure"]) } else { json!([]) }}),
|
||||
"launch" => self.launched.clone(),
|
||||
_ => json!({"disposition": {"delivery": "delivered_unverified"}}),
|
||||
@@ -1219,6 +1324,19 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert!(fake.commands().iter().all(|c| c == "list-windows" || c == "snapshot"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_field_read_as_secure_is_refused_as_a_password_field() {
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
s.pc_control.type_text = Level::Auto;
|
||||
let (pc, fake, _) = pc_with(s, Fake { secure_ref: Some("@s1:e900"), ..Fake::new() });
|
||||
read_first(&pc);
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("type", OWNER, json!({"ref": "@s1:e900", "text": TYPED, "consent": true})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply, json!({"ok": false, "error": PASSWORD}));
|
||||
assert!(!fake.commands().contains(&"set-value".to_owned()));
|
||||
// Other fields of the same reading are typed into.
|
||||
assert_eq!(pc.act(&action("type", OWNER, json!({"ref": "@s1:e3", "text": TYPED}))).code, "ok");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_reading_has_interactive_elements_first_at_most_200_and_cut_to_120_characters() {
|
||||
let (pc, _, _) = pc_with(settings(), Fake::new());
|
||||
@@ -1300,6 +1418,66 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn run_with_the_program_already_running_answers_the_window_launch_names() {
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
s.pc_control.run = Level::Auto;
|
||||
// agent-desktop attaches to a running instance and names its window; nothing new appears.
|
||||
let fake = Fake { launched: json!({"app": "notepad.exe", "pid": 10, "window": {"id": "w-1", "title": TITLE}}), ..Fake::new() };
|
||||
let (pc, _, _) = pc_with(s.clone(), fake);
|
||||
let started = Instant::now();
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("run", OWNER, json!({"program": "notepad"})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply["item"]["window"]["id"], "w-1", "{o:?}");
|
||||
assert!(started.elapsed() < WINDOW_WAIT, "answered without waiting for a new window");
|
||||
// Several running: launch cannot choose, and the answer says so (not an element's reason).
|
||||
let fake = Fake { fail: Some(("launch", "AMBIGUOUS_TARGET")), ..Fake::new() };
|
||||
let (pc, _, _) = pc_with(s, fake);
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("run", OWNER, json!({"program": "notepad"})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply, json!({"ok": false, "error": RUNNING_SEVERAL}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn keys_to_a_window_that_cannot_come_to_the_front_say_nothing_was_sent() {
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
s.pc_control.type_text = Level::Auto;
|
||||
// Windows' foreground lock: focus-window fails, or press cannot confirm the window's focus.
|
||||
for (cmd, code) in [("focus-window", "ACTION_FAILED"), ("press", "STALE_REF")] {
|
||||
let fake = Fake { fail: Some((cmd, code)), ..Fake::new() };
|
||||
let (pc, fake, _) = pc_with(s.clone(), fake);
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("keys", OWNER, json!({"window": "notepad", "keys": "ctrl+s"})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply, json!({"ok": false, "error": NOT_FRONT}), "{cmd}");
|
||||
assert!(cmd == "press" || !fake.commands().contains(&"press".to_owned()), "no key after a failed focus");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn an_action_that_closes_its_window_is_done_with_nothing_left_to_read() {
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
s.pc_control.type_text = Level::Auto;
|
||||
// Enter on a dialog (or a click on its button) closes it: the fresh reading finds no window.
|
||||
let (pc, _, _) = pc_with(s, Fake { fail: Some(("snapshot", "WINDOW_NOT_FOUND")), ..Fake::new() });
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("keys", OWNER, json!({"window": "notepad", "keys": "enter"})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply, json!({"ok": true, "item": {"window": {"id": "w-1", "program": "notepad", "title": TITLE}, "elements": []}}));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.code, "ok");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_program_that_does_not_close_in_time_is_said_to_be_still_open() {
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
s.pc_control.click = Level::Auto;
|
||||
// A save question keeps the program open; close-app gives up after its own deadline.
|
||||
let fake = Fake { fail: Some(("close-app", "TIMEOUT")), ..Fake::new() };
|
||||
let (pc, _, _) = pc_with(s, fake);
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("close", OWNER, json!({"window": "notepad"})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply, json!({"ok": false, "error": NOT_CLOSED}));
|
||||
// Several of it running: close-app picks by name and cannot choose.
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
s.pc_control.click = Level::Auto;
|
||||
let (pc, _, _) = pc_with(s, Fake { fail: Some(("close-app", "AMBIGUOUS_TARGET")), ..Fake::new() });
|
||||
let o = pc.act(&action("close", OWNER, json!({"window": "notepad"})));
|
||||
assert_eq!(o.reply, json!({"ok": false, "error": CLOSE_SEVERAL}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn the_activity_names_the_program_only() {
|
||||
let mut s = settings();
|
||||
@@ -1352,6 +1530,20 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(envelope(b"garbage"), Err("APP_NO_JSON".into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn agent_desktops_state_folder_is_made_afresh_each_start() {
|
||||
// What a folder made under another ACL holds would keep that ACL, and readings of an
|
||||
// earlier run are of no use: the folder starts empty.
|
||||
let data = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("jarvis-pc-{}-{}", std::process::id(), rand::random::<u32>()));
|
||||
let home = data.join("runtime").join("agent-desktop");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(home.join("refmaps")).unwrap();
|
||||
std::fs::write(home.join("refmaps").join("old.json"), "{}").unwrap();
|
||||
let _cli = Cli::new(Path::new("agent-desktop.exe"), &data);
|
||||
assert!(home.is_dir());
|
||||
assert_eq!(std::fs::read_dir(&home).unwrap().count(), 0);
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&data);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn the_package_and_m0_pin_the_same_agent_desktop() {
|
||||
let root = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user